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ON COLLECT IVE  AND PART-COLLECT IVE  GOODS 
BY 
JAN TINBERGEN* 
1 DEFINITIONS OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
A still useful definition of a collective good as distinguished from an individual 
good is that its 'consumption' by one individual does not reduce the possibility 
for other individuals to 'consume' it (Samuelson, 1954). A few examples are a 
TV broadcast, he police and a nation's highway system (excluding toll ways). In 
section 4 the complete set of collective goods will be discussed. Of the three 
examples mentioned the TV broadcast is closest o apurely collective good. The 
other two usually are close, but not always. Extended riots may require so much 
of the police force that police are not available for a case of theft. On the first day 
of a holiday period highways may be overcrowded and not available for an 
additional car. In the latter two cases we will speak of part-collective goods; 
these will be discussed in sections 3 through 8. 
The definition given may be replaced by alternative definitions. One is that 
collective goods are the goods produced by public authorities. Accordingly the 
phrase public goods has been used iv.stead of collective goods. This definition 
may be combined with the statement that one of the reasons why public 
authorities produce these goods is that public authorities produce them more 
cheaply than private producers. An extreme case is that either private initiative 
or private capital is lacking to run the production process under discussion. 
Three examples may be given. In 1902 the Dutch State Mines (DSM) were 
established to mine coal, since private capital and initiative were too weak. Since 
1930 the Dutch state runs a number of farms on newly reclaimed land for a 
limited number of years; experience with private farming on previously reclai- 
med land (Haarlemmermeer) having shown that the risks were so large that all 
first owners of parcels went bankrupt. The third example is the creation by the 
Turkish government in 1923 under Atatiirk of the 'state conomic enterprises' 
in various branches of industry: at that time private intitiative to industrialize 
Turkey was too weak again. 
Another alternative definition of collective goods is the one adhered to by 
* Emeritus Professor,  E rasmus University, Rot terdam,  the Nether lands.  I am indebted to Profes- 
sors P. Henn ipman and D. J .  Wo l f  son for useful discussions. Remain ing  errors  are mine, of  course. 
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most of today's authors on the subject, namely that they are nonexcludable and, 
as a consequence, nonrival. The subtleties of these qualitative xpressions do 
not affect, however, the mathematical structure of utility functions. Rightly 
Samuelson, in his 1981 article, sticks to the structure of his 1954 treatment. 
Alongside purely collective goods, a number of not purely collective goods 
has been identified by various authors. Thus, Drbze (1974) deals with semi-col- 
lective goods, of which an interesting example is a collective good that is only 
available in a restricted geographical rea. 
Goedhart (1975), Wolfson (1979) and several Anglo-Saxon authors, for 
instance Brown and Jackson (1978), introduced the concept of quasi-collective 
goods, which may be said to have a private component but are made available 
by public authorities at prices below cost. An important example is schooling. 
The category of not purely collective goods to be discussed in the present 
essay is different again and constitutes another aspect already briefly set out. It 
has some similarity to quasi-collective goods, but cannot be identified with the 
latter. 
2 SOME ADDITIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
The second definition of collective goods discussed in section 1 suggests that 
their production is required by law. Admittedly government activities are 
regulated by legislation. Yet at least part of them do not produce collective 
goods. Most state enterprises also produce individual rather than collective 
goods. In our view (also shared by Goedhart, 1981) collective goods are not 
necessarily produced by public authorities. A TV broadcast or a highway 
usually are produced by private associations (in the Dutch system, at least) or 
private firms. But public authorities do assume some responsibility for them 
and this is regulated by law. In what follows we will consider as the normal case 
that collective goods are 'ordered' by 'the government,' the latter expression 
being shorthand for public authorities at the various levels. Producers are paid 
for supplying the collective good ordered by the government out of tax revenue 
and taxes are collected from citizens. Purely collective goods are 'consumed' by 
all citizens in the same quantity, which is the implication of the definition to 
which we shall adhere. The tax paid for the availability of a collective good will 
be supposed to be such that it reflects the marginal utility of that good to the tax 
paper. All this will be translated into a simple mathematical model in section 8. 
Parliamentary decisions on the quantities of each collective good to be made 
available by the government are assumed to be in line with the marginal utilities 
of each citizen. This assumption implies that the parliamentary majority's 
judgement of these marginal utilities is substituted for the marginal utilities as 
experienced by the citizens themselves. This is our alternative to Wicksell's 
overly idealistic requirement ofunanimous decisions on the volume of collective 
goods to be made available (cf Hennipman, 1977, 1982). 
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In the present essay our main objective is how to introduce into economic 
theory the existence of part-collective goods. As stated in the beginning of this 
article, such goods occasionally are not available to all citizens who want them. 
On such occasions the responsible authorities must allocate the availibility of 
the part-collective good under discussion. Such an allocation may consist of 
some sort of rationing for which they must develop a set of rules. On a crowded 
highway priority over other vehicles may be given to the fire brigade, to an 
ambulance, etc. In our model this allocation will also have to be expressed by a 
set of equations. 
Situations are conceivable in which negative-valued collective 'goods' occur. 
The best-known example is the 'security' supplied by organized criminals who 
claim a contribution from shopkeepers. We shall not pursue this phenomenon. 
In most nations minority groups (the parliamentary opposition) are in favour 
of establishing collective goods not (yet) in existence or larger (alternatively, 
smaller) quantities of existing collective goods. In the course of history changes 
in the quantities of a number of collective goods have occurred. This applies to 
the examples given so far, TV broadcasts, police and highways. It also applies to 
many of the concrete additional examples to be discussed in section 4. 
This raises the general question whether collective goods should be restricted 
to those required by legislation or whether a more fundamental source should 
be substituted for legislation. In fact, legislation itself is based on more funda- 
metal sources. It is commonplace to consider ethical or religious principles as 
the source of positive law. 
Since this article deals with positive economics only and not with normative 
economics, we leave this question to a later study. 
3 DEFINITION OF PART-COLLECTIVE GOODS 
In section 1 we already briefly touched upon the possibility that there are goods 
where the consumption by one individual does not reduce other persons' 
consumption possibility by the full amount of the first person's consumption, 
but nevertheless omewhat reduces that possibility, given the total availability 
of the good considered. This category of goods will be called part-collective. 
Two examples have been mentioned in section 1. In contradistinction to indivi- 
dual or private goods, where the second person's consumption possibility - with 
a given supply - is reduced by the full amount and purely collective goods, where 
it is not reduced at all, we have to do here with a category that may be 
characterized by a continuous parameter related to the degree to which other 
potential consumers have to reduce their consumption. 
Two further points must be made. One is that the same good may move within 
a zone where the parameter mentioned assumes a range of different values. The 
good is not, therefore, identified by that parameter. 
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The other is that external data affect the parameter's value. In the police 
example given in section 1 it is the riots which affect police availability for other 
tasks. In the congestion example it is the holiday period's beginning which 
reduces highway capacity to additional cars. 
4 AN ENUMERATION OF COLLECTIVE AND PART-COLLECTIVE GOODS 
The main task of a positive theory of collective and part-collective goods 
consists of an explanation of the mechanism by which the quantities of all sorts 
of goods and services produced, distributed and consumed as well as their prices 
are determined. We will restrict ourselves to a closed economy and to the 
short-run statics of the mechanism. By 'goods' we understand goods and 
services. 
One essential feature of a theory and its representation by a model is that it 
should be complete in the sense of containing all goods, all individuals and all 
firms which together form the economy considered. With regard to individual 
goods, completeness can be checked by statistics of household accounts and of 
production; with regard to individuals the census of population statistics and so 
on. In order to cover all collective goods we may lack an exhaustive source of 
information. If we had adhered to the definition that collective goods are those 
produced by public authorities their combined budgets might have been a 
source of information. Because of our assumption that government is responsi- 
ble for the availibility of collective goods we may still use that source, keeping in 
mind, however, that some government products how individual components. 
We will have to add some collective goods not (completely) covered by legisla- 
tion, however. 
From an inspection of the responsibilities of ministries and their equivalents 
at lower levels (down to local authorities) we derived the enumeration given 
below, which contains the examples given earlier. 
Internal security (police, justice, fire brigades) 
External security (military authorities' tasks, diplomatic service) 
Transportation i frastructure, water level control 
Information (statistics, libraries, news media incl. TV, radio, planning) 
School system, research and publication of its results 
Clean air, water, soil; maintenance of natural and cultural monuments 
Social security, including working time and labour conditions(cf. Hartog, 1981) 
Health services (not considered to be collective by Goedhart) 
Maintenance of a competitive production and distribution system. 
If this enumeration is accepted, a few remarks have to be added. 
(i) Purely collective goods are relatively rare. Some types of information, 
working time and labour conditions are perhaps the best examples. 
(ii) As stressed in all preceding text, many of the collective goods listed are 
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part-collective only: this applies to police, transportation i frastructure, 
social security, health services, and several others. 
(iii) The 'maintenance of a competitive production and distribution system' is 
largely taken care of by private ntrepreneurs, but up to a point only. Many 
markets are oligopolies! 
(iv) As stated at the end of section 2, the list may be completed by a number of 
collective or part-collective goods not required by legislation, but by ethical 
or religious principles. Some examples are: to be a good citizen, a good 
parent o one's children, and a good partner in marriage. Most economists 
today would not include these xamples in their lists. Yet there may be good 
reasons to do so. As mentioned, the subject will be left to a later study. 
5 THE CONTINUUM OF PART-COLLECT IVE  GOODS 
As set out in the preceding sections, part-collective goods constitute a range of 
goods - or rather, of goods in changing environments - between the sharply 
defined categories of individual and purely Collective goods. The essential 
relationship which distinguishes private from purely collective goods is the one 
between the supply available uand the quantities consumed uibY individuals i(i 
= 1 . . . . .  /). For individual goods this relationship is
u = Z u~ (5.1) 
i' 
whereas for purely collective goods a set of equations applies 
u i=u( i=  1,2 . . . . .  /) (5.2) 
The question to be dealt with in this section is whether we can find one relation 
containing a parameter, say p, which covers the complete range of all part-col- 
lective goods with individual and purely collective goods as special cases. The 
answer is yes and has been inspired by our knowledge of CES production 
functions (cf Kreijger, 1978, De Boer, 1981, where this knowledge is summari- 
zed and the initiators of this branch of economics are quoted). For our purpose 
a special case is needed: 
u-P = Z u;p (5,3) 
i 
This relation becomes (5.1) for 9 = -1 and it has been shown that for O ~ o3 it 
converges towards the set (5.2). Its only parameter p is connected with the Allen 
elasticity of substitution oij (i ~ j) by 
o = 1/(1 + O) (5.4) 
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Since our interpretat ion of (5.3) is not one of a product ion function, the Allen 
substitut ion elasticity does not enter into our uti l ization. 
For  the study of part-col lective goods the most interesting question is the 
relation between the total quantity of such a good avai lable (u) and the sum E i u i 
of the quantit ies demanded.  As an example let us take a simple case where the u i 
are the 'quantity" o f  highway needed fo r  one car and let all cars require the same 
space which we take as the unit. For  a total number Io f ind iv idua ls  we then have 
]~ U i~ I 
i 
Using our formula (5.3) to calculate u we get: 
(5.5) 
u=t  l- i/~ (5.6) 
The total number of cars which the highway network's  capacity permits to 
circulate will be 
I u =k i lo  (5.7) 
F rom an analysis of  formulae (5.6) and (5.7) we may conclude that the relevant 
interval for P in this part icular  appl icat ion is 
-oo<p<-  1 (5.8) 
where p = - oo corresponds to a purely collective and p = - 1 to a private good. 
Some values of I u are shown below and a numerical example has been added: 
p _oo - 10 -2  - 1.5 - 1 
I u I 1 ~ 10.5 10.67 I 
For  I = (Coll.) (Priv.) 
1 mill ion: 1 4 1000 10000 1000000 
The value - oo corresponds with a purely collective good ad p ---- - 1 with a 
private good where everybody's  car may circulate. Part-col lective goods are 
represented by the range between these two values; close to 9 = -1 almost all 
cars and for high negative values of  p relatively few are accommodated:  there is 
congestion. 
It is interesting that the interval of p that makes sense for our problem is the 
one excluded when (5.3) constitutes a CES product ion function. As set out 
elsewhere (Tinbergen, 1982) even then it depends on the problem studied which 
interval of p-values is relevant: it is different for problems in which 'essential '  
product ion factors only are considered from problems where nonessential 
product ion factors come in. 
ON COLLECTIVE AND PART-COLLECTIVE GOODS 177 
6 A POSITIVE THEORY OF FINANCING THE AVAILABILITY OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
As set out in section 2 we consider essential not the production but the 'ordering' 
of collective and part-collective goods by government. Since we are not dealing 
with a normative problem, but only with a positive (or 'analytical') treatment of 
the role of these goods, the question we want to answer in this section is no more 
than how governments are financing the collective and part-collective goods 
'ordered.' A further restriction is that we only deal with a static theory. This 
implies that the goods ordered are paid and the total amount o be paid equals 
public revenue. Such revenue is collected from taxes in the widest sense, inclu- 
ding contributions to a social security system and retributions. 
Finally we make the assumption that taxes paid by enterprises (indirect axes) 
are a payment for government services upplied to producers. Admittedly this 
assumption is hardly warranted, but in national accounting it has often been 
made. This reduces the budget we consider to the budget for collective and 
part-collective goods supplied to consumers and the revenue to direct axes and 
retributions as well as consumer contributions to the social security system. For 
a different reatment see Samuelson (1982), where indirect taxes are the only 
taxes. 
The main element of choice remains whether equilibrium is interpreted as the 
equality between total revenue and total expenditures on collective or part-col- 
lective goods, or whether some or all of the payments for the K types of such 
goods we shall introduce in our model are covered by particular types of 
revenue. In the former case there will appear one government budget equation, 
whereas in the latter there may be more, up to K such equations. The latter 
would apply in particular if the decision on the 'ordering' of some collective 
good were taken jointly with the decision on the source of financing. In practice 
this seldom occurs, to the regret of Finance ministers; but there do exist 
special-purpose taxes. In fact they are the best guarantee for rational decisions 
on public finance. 
7 THE NEED FOR AN ALLOCATION SYSTEM FOR PART-COLLECTIVE GOODS 
The last concept o be elaborated somewhat more than in section 2 (where it was 
first mentioned) isthe concept of an allocation system needed for part-collective 
goods. For purely collective goods no allocation is needed. The quantity availa- 
ble is fully available to all citizens; our example ofa TV broadcast illustrates that 
situation. In the first paragraphs of section 1 we mentioned the circumstances in 
which part-collective goods may, in contrast, not always be available. In section 
2 we mentioned some allocation systems. In the present section some further 
elaboration is offered. In doing so we shall have in mind more examples than 
those of the police and the highway network. Among the collective goods 
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mentioned in section 4 the following provide additional examples: libraries, 
schools, distribution of research results, maintenance of a clean environment, 
such social security as takes the form of unemployment, sickness and other 
benefits and health services. 
One method of allocation consists of the establishment ofpriorities amongst 
categories of different quality. Thus the police force will be used primarily for 
more serious categories of disaster or crime, and less serious categories may 
have to be left to later occasions. Water-level control will be exerted first of all in 
cases of floods and minor adjustments for agricultural purposes constitute a
secondary concern. Groups of students admitted to universities may be catego- 
rized according to scores attained in secondary schools. A less attractive system 
is one of drawing lots. 
A second method of allocation, applying to equally urgent cases within one 
category, consists of rationing. Students of equal ability may receive scholarship 
of equal amounts, at a level determined by total financial means available. In 
times of serious depression, unemployment and other social benefits may have 
to be lowered: another sort of rationing. Rationing of individual consumer 
goods in periods of extreme scarcity is a feature of many emergencies. 
A third allocation system may be shifting over time of the availability of 
goods until circumstances have become more favourable. Another word for 
such shifting is queuing or the establishment of a waitinglist. Libraries regularly 
apply this technique. For individual goods such as motor cars waiting lists are 
well known in Eastern Europe. 
As a last case we mention the allocation system of two-partpricing. In order to 
obtain the part-collective good desired the person involved may be required to 
pay a fixed amount (lump sum) plus a price per unit. This is the system 
recommended (by Goedhart, 1981, and others) according to the so-called 
benefit principle. Thus, university students may be charged a teaching fee 
depending on later incomes: they are given a loan which they have to pay back 
partly only, depending on future income. 
8 A SIMPLE MODEL AS AN ILLUSTRATION 
In this final section the interdependence of the elements discussed earlier will be 
shown with the aid of a simple static short-run model. In it we use the following 
subscripts: i = 1 . . . . .  I for consumers, h = 1 . . . . .  H for producing firms and 
superscriptsj = 1 . . . . .  J fo r  individual or private goods and k = 1 . . . . .  K for  
(part)collective goods. Since the model is meant for the short run all capital is 
assumed to be given; so is income C i derived from capital by person i. The 
explicit version of the model assumes all production to show diminishing 
returns. The corresponding supply equations for constant or increasing returns 
indicate supply to be equal to (given) capacity or zero, so as to maximize profit 
or to opt for satisficing production. 
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The variables entering the model and their numbers are listed below. 
xj consumption of individual good j by consumer i IJ 
y~ production of individual good j by firm h HJ 
pJ price of individual good j J 
X i Lagrange multiplier for consumer i in maximizing utility co i
constrained by budget equation I 
u~ use of (part)collective good k by consumer i IK 
k production of (part)collective good k by firm h HK v h 
qk price of (part)collective good k K 
q~ tax paid for (part)collective good k by consumer i IK 
l/x quantity of labour supplied by individual i to produce good j IJ 
l~y. quantity of labour demanded by form h to produce good j HI  
wJ wage of labour used in production of good j J 
t~ quantity of labour supplied by individual i to produce good k IK 
l~v quantity of labour demanded by form h to produce good k HK 
w k wage of labour used in production of good k K 
Total number of (unknown) variables: I + Zl + 2K + 2HJ + 2HK + 2IJ + 31K 
The equations of the model are: 
Budget equation for individual i: 
_ 32pixj _ 32 q k (u k) + 32 l~ wE + 32 l~ w k + C~ = 0 
j k j k 
(1) i 
~o) i
Demand by i for j: -- ~.//~ (2) IJ 
OxJ 
0o3 i Oqi k 
Demand by i for k: -- L i ~ (3) IK 
au,  
~0~ i 
Supply of labour by i for j: - -  = - kiwi 
Supply of labour by i for k: 
0% 
- -  X iwk 
(4) I J  
(5) ~K 
Budget equations for government: 32 q~ = qk 32 v~ (Cases 1,2) (6) K 
i 
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= ~k (Cases 3,4) Budget equation for government: E Y qk 32 qk y~ vh 
k i k (6) 1 
Supply of indiv, good j: YJh = alh (lJhv) ?~J~ (7) HJ 
Supply of (part) coil. good k: v~ = b~ (l~v) lahk (8) HK 
Demand for labour to produce good j: XJh aUh (l)hy) ~'~ - 1 = Vr (9) HJ 
k L'k 1 Demand for labour to produce good k: p.~ b~ (lhv) h - 
Market equilibrium for good j: 32 x~. = 32 Y/h 
i h 
~_ w k 
(10) HK 
(1 I) J 
Availability of (purely) collective good k: u~ = ~ v~ h (Cases 1,3) 
(12) IK 
Availabity of part-collective good k: 
(Z v~,)- 0 = X; (uf)- p 
h 
( -~  <-  1) 
(Cases 2,4) (13) K 
As will be understood, the utility functions c0 i, the production functions and 
the tax functions qf (u~jare considered to be given. 
Market equilibrium for labour producing ood j: 
Y, l~x = ]~ lJhy (14) J 
i h 
Market equilibrium for labour producing ood k: 
x l~. = x 1L (15) K 
i h 
As shown for equations (6) and (12) we have distinguished four cases 
characterized asfollows: apart from the individual goods we have in: 
Case 1. Only purely collective goods, each of them financed by special taxes 
Case 2. Only part-collective goods, each of them financed by special taxes 
Case 3. Only purely collective goods, financed out of total govt. budget 
Case 4. Only part-collective goods, financed out of total govt. budget 
It will be understood that 'mixed' cases can be easily modelled, by combining 
features of the alternative forms of equations (6) or (12) or both. In the four 
cases shown the numbers of equations differ as follows: 
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Case 1. I + 2J + 2K + 2HJ + 2HK + 2IJ + 3IK 
Case 2. I + 2J + 3K + 2HJ + 2HK + 2IJ + 2IK 
Case 3. 1 + I + 2J + K + 2HJ + 2HK + 2IJ + 3IK 
Case 4. 1 + I + 2J + 2K + 2HJ + 2HK + 2IJ + 2IK 
Consequently in some cases a number of degrees of freedom results, to be 
found as the difference between the number of variables and of equations. They 
appear to be K (I - 1) in Case 2, K - 1 in Case 3 and IK - 1 in Case 4. Case 1 
appears to be determinate. If degrees of freedom are available, they may be used 
by the government to impose restrictions on the taxes in order to maximize, as 
far as possible, some collective utility function. Such additional equations may 
also specify a particular system of allocation, supposed by parliament o be 
optimal. 
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Summary 
ON COLLECTIVE AND PART-COLLECTIVE GOODS 
Part-collective goods are defined as a continuum between private and purely collective 
goods. Their degree of collectivity is indicated by a parameter as used in a special case of 
the CES production function. Factor inputs in the latter play the role of quantities 
available to individuals of the collective good; product in the production function 
corresponds with total quantity available of the collective good. Parameter values range 
from -1 (private goods) to -oo (purely collective goods). External data determine the 
varying parameter values of a given partly collective good. The latter are in need of an 
allocation system. 
